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Do you still use Sony’s Betamax Video Tape Recorder (VTR) to
record television programming? Or do you prefer to use something more
modern, such as a digital video recorder (DVR)? Apparently the Ninth
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Circuit prefers to stick with Sony’s VTR for its legal analysis. 1 In Fox
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C. 2 the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, reasoning
that it is fair use for Dish subscribers to amass libraries of primetime
programming from Fox, ABC, NBC, and CBS (Major Networks) with
Dish Network’s Primetime Anytime service. 3 The court’s decision
rested on its strict adherence to a U.S. Supreme Court decision from
1984 that held recording television programming on Sony’s Betamax
VTR is fair use. 4 If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is indicative of anything,
the entire business model of the broadcasting industry may be in
jeopardy.
The broadcasting industry is at war. The Major Networks are
battling to maintain a stable source of income, whether through
retransmission fees or advertising revenue. For instance, Time Warner
Cable (Time Warner) and CBS recently ended a month-long dispute
over a new retransmission consent agreement that would permit Time
Warner to retransmit CBS’s television programming to Time Warner’s
customers. 5 At the center of the dispute was what the industry is paying
for retransmission rights. 6 Although CBS was asking for a 600%
increase in retransmission fees, its demands were in sync with the rest of
the industry. 7 The stalemate produced a “black-out” after Time Warner
elected to stop providing the CBS-owned Showtime, TMC, Flix, and
Smithsonian networks to their three million subscribers in major
metropolitan areas across the nation. 8 Time Warner and CBS
compromised in early September 2013, but such disputes are
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1. See infra Part III.
2. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. Jon Lafayette, Time Warner Drops CBS Stations, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 2,
2013, 5:12 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/news-articles/time-warner-drops-cbsstations/114693; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, CBS, Google, Nestle, Umami, HTC: Intellectual
Property (1), BLOOMBERG WIRE (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-04/cbsgoogle-nestle-umami-htc-intellectual-property.html.
6. Lafayette, supra note 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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commonplace in the industry. 9 In fact, Fox and Dish Network had a
similar dispute in 2010 before finally renegotiating the retransmission
consent agreement that is at issue in the current proceedings. 10 This
tension in the industry also grabbed Congressional attention. 11 To top it
off, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to settle an ongoing
dispute between the Major Networks and Aereo, a company that uses
mini-antennas to capture broadcast television and then record it on
cloud-based digital video recorders for its users. 12
It is no coincidence that as the Major Networks struggle to charge a
premium for retransmission rights, they are also battling Dish Network
in “the biggest copyright case since Napster.” 13 The litigation is over
Dish’s “Hopper” HD DVR system and Primetime Anytime (PTAT)
service. 14 PTAT includes “AutoHop,” an ad-skipping service that
eliminates all commercials from primetime programming. 15 By skipping
over the commercials in the Major Networks’ programming, Dish’s
AutoHop undercuts the value of those commercials to advertisers.16
Since advertising revenues generate 90% of funding for the television
programming provided by the Major Networks, Dish Network’s new
services jeopardize the financial stability of the entire broadcasting
industry. 17
Evidently, the issues presented in Fox v. Dish Network affect an
entire industry rather than the two named parties. Higher retransmission

9. Id. For instance, Time Warner has taken down nearly 50 other channels in the past 5
years for similar disputes. Id.
10. See Meg James, Fox, Dish Network Resolve Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/30/business/fi-ct-dish-20101030. Interestingly enough, the 2010
agreement is also at issue in Fox v. Dish Network. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C.,
723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
11. In May 2013, Arizona Senator John McCain introduced a bill that would drive down
costs for consumers by requiring cable providers to offer programming on an “a la carte” basis
instead of through bundles. See Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013, S. 912, 113th Cong.
(2013).
12. See Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014). The Aereo litigation is
only one facet of the broadcasting industry’s ongoing struggle to maintain control over how its
programming is viewed. See Sarah Weber, The Supreme Court Could Decide How You Watch TV,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 11, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-supreme-court-coulddecide-how-you-watch-tv-2014-1.
13. Meg James & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Networks’ Fight with Dish over Ad-skipping has
TIMES
(May
25,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/
Huge
Implications,
L.A.
2012/may/25/entertainment/la-et-ct-broadcast-networks-fight-with-dish-over-adskipping-hasenormous-implications-20120525 (quoting Attorney Bonnie Eskenazi).
14. See Complaint at 2, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (C.D.
Cal. 2012) (No. CV12-04529GHK(SHx)).
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 22.
17. Id. at 21-23.
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fees for cable providers may be in the near future if advertisers lose their
incentive to pay for commercial spots on the Major Networks. If cable
and satellite television providers such as Time Warner pay higher
retransmission fees, those increases will ultimately be passed to the
consumers. 18 Indeed, the three million “black-out” victims may have
only received a taste of what is to come. The various amicus briefs of the
current proceedings also reflect the multiple interests at stake and the
implications the Fox v. Dish Network litigation may have. 19
Furthermore, the Fox v. Dish Network litigation afforded the Ninth
Circuit the opportunity to address the legality of two practices that have
yet to be adequately addressed: library-building and ad-skipping. 20 The
Ninth Circuit’s decision avoided these issues by applying the fair use
doctrine incorrectly. 21 Although fair use is a fact-specific doctrine, the
court equated the facts of Fox v. Dish Network to Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 22 in order to avoid addressing both issues.
This Note argues that if the Ninth Circuit had conducted a more in-depth
fair use analysis, it would have found that Sony was less controlling than
the court purported it to be, and that the use of Dish’s PTAT does not
constitute fair use.
Part II of this Note discusses the doctrine of fair use, its application
in Sony, and how the ruling of Sony has been relatively unchallenged
since 1984. 23 The discussion portrays the significance of the Fox v. Dish
Network litigation and also helps the reader recognize the inadequate fair
use analysis of the Ninth Circuit. Part III discusses the facts of the Fox v.
Dish Network litigation. Part IV addresses the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous
decision to exclude Dish’s AutoHop service from its analysis and
subsequently analyzes each fair use factor individually. 24 This part also
shows how the court ignored critical factual differences between Dish’s
PTAT service and Sony’s VTR and how the court consequently erred in
using Sony’s fair use analysis as a crutch in its analysis. Finally, Part IV
offers concluding remarks about the Fox v. Dish Network litigation.
18. See James & Chmielewski, supra note 13.
19. Brief for Cablevision Systems Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants;
Brieffor ABC Television Affiliates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants; Brief for Nat’l
Assoc. of Broadcasters Supporting Appellants; Brief for Paramount Pictures Corp. et al. as Amici
Curiae Urging Reversal; Brief for Advertising Council, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellants, Dish, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088.
20. Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (noting that the drafters structured §
107 as an affirmative defense).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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BACKGROUND

It is necessary to discuss some preliminary information to fully
appreciate the significance of the Fox v. Dish Network litigation. Fox is
seeking to hold Dish liable for direct and contributory copyright
infringement. 25 Contributory copyright infringement is a form of liability
imposed to hold one liable for the infringing conduct of another when
the circumstances warrant it. 26 Dish asserted that the use of PTAT by its
users is fair use, which is an affirmative defense to a copyright
infringement claim. 27 Because the Ninth Circuit agreed with Dish, Fox
failed on its contributory copyright infringement claim; therefore, no
infringement liability remained. 28 Thus, it is necessary to discuss the
legal underpinnings of fair use because it determines whether Dish can
be held liable for contributory copyright infringement.
The Ninth Circuit’s fair use analysis hinged on the Supreme Court’s

25. Complaint, supra note 14, at 51-76.
26. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. There are generally two types of contributory infringers:
providers of a service or distributors of a product. See 4 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12.04 [A][3] (2009); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003); MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942 (2005). Traditionally, courts held
individuals liable “who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court added the second category for
distributors of products in Sony, where it adopted patent law’s substantial non-infringing uses
standard, which immunizes the distributor of a product if it is capable of substantial non-infringing
uses. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441-42. Since Sony, courts have struggled with the doctrine of contributory
infringement and often reach contradicting results. See Brandon Michael Francavillo, Comment,
Pretzel Logic: The Ninth Circuit’s Approach to Contributory Copyright Infringement Mandates
That the Supreme Court Revisit Sony, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 855, 872 (2004) (discussing the different
results reached by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in contributory copyright infringement cases
involving peer-to-peer technology); Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 861 (2004)
(arguing that the different results reached in peer-to-peer cases show the need to reflect on the
viability of Sony). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Grokster in 2005, and many hoped
the decision would clarify the contributory infringement doctrine. However, the Court only briefly
discussed Sony and adopted patent law’s inducement doctrine instead. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 913. As
a result, the contributory infringement doctrine still remains unclear and inconsistent. See generally
Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV. 675 (2011)
(arguing that the courts should adopt principles from epidemiology to create a more certain
contributory infringement doctrine); Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-toPeer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2005); Rebecca Giblin, A Bit Liable? A Guide to Navigating
the U.S. Secondary Liability Patchwork, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 7 (2009);
David L. Wardle, Broken Record: Revisiting the Flaws in Sony’s Fair Use Analysis in Light of the
Grokster Decision, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2005). Therefore, Fox v. Dish Network offers an
opportunity to clarify the obscure contributory infringement doctrine.
27. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (noting
that the drafters structured § 107 as an affirmative defense).
28. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
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landmark Sony decision from 1984. 29 It is therefore imperative that
Sony’s fair use analysis is dissected to understand how it compares to the
Fox v. Dish Network litigation. Moreover, consumers used Sony’s
Betamax VTR for time-shifting, ad-skipping, and library-building, but
the Supreme Court only addressed the legality of time-shifting. 30 A brief
survey of various changes since 1984 demonstrates that despite the
proliferation of more advanced time-shifting devices, the legality of
time-shifting, library-building, and ad-skipping has not been challenged
since 1984. 31
A. Fair Use
The fundamental policy of copyright law is to promote “the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 32 To further this policy, the
Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) granted exclusive rights to authors,
subject to certain limitations. 33 One such limitation is the fair use
doctrine. 34 Fair use is an affirmative defense that enables the
unauthorized use of copyrighted work without liability for
infringement. 35 This fulfills the policy of copyright law by allowing
people to build upon the works of others without legal repercussions. 36
Before the Act, courts applied fair use as an equitable rule of reason
tailored to the particular facts of each case. 37 When Congress passed the
Act, it expressly stated that it only intended to give statutory recognition
to the doctrine and that § 107 should not be construed to alter it in any
manner. 38 Except for a minor change in 1992, Congress continues to
have little involvement in the application of the fair use doctrine. 39
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442-56.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012);
Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
33. The preamble of § 106 grants exclusive rights “subject to sections 107 through 122.” 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
35. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (noting
that the drafters structured § 107 as an affirmative defense).
36. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 477; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994). Fair use also functions as a safeguard to freedom of expression. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at
891.
37. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.1973), aff’d,
420 U.S. 376 (1975); Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
38. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975).
39. After Harper & Row, courts began to give too much weigh to the unpublished nature of a
copyrighted work. See NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.05 [A][2]. In response, Congress amended §
107 to state that “the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use.” See
Fair Use of Unpublished Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992).
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The Supreme Court has only decided three fair use cases since
1976, and while the decisions provide assistance to lower courts, they
are not bright line rules. 40 Because fair use depends on the facts of each
case, no clear definition has ever emerged. 41 Aware of this, Congress
provided a list of non-exclusive factors to be considered in § 107 while
emphasizing that each decision should be tailored to the particular facts
of the case. 42
The first factor under § 107 directs the court to consider the purpose
and character of the use in question, which includes considering whether
such use is for commercial or nonprofit purposes. 43 However, the
profit/nonprofit distinction has minimal utility. 44 The Supreme Court’s
original position was that every commercial use is presumptively
unfair. 45 This is problematic because nearly every use, including the
examples in § 107’s preamble, is for profit. 46 Thus, the Court’s more
recent decision refuted this presumption and clarified that a profit-driven
purpose is only one of many factors to be considered. 47 Given the
problems with the profit/nonprofit distinction, courts are more inclined
to focus on the use instead of the user, and view the commercial nature
as a matter of degree rather than an absolute. 48
The overarching purpose of the first factor analysis is to determine
whether the use in question is “transformative.” 49 A work is
transformative if it adds new expression, meaning, or something of a
different character.50 Courts favor a transformative use because it is
consistent with the legislative intent behind § 107 and the overall policy
of copyright law. 51 While it is not required that a new work be
“transformative,” it is the dominant judicial test. 52 The majority of
40. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588.
The Supreme Court also addressed fair use in Stewart v. Abend. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990). However, this decision is often not included in the Supreme Court’s fair use decisions
because of its short analysis. See Stephen McJohn, The Case of the Missing Case: Stewart v. Abend
and Fair Use, 53 IDEA 323 (2013).
41. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 475-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473 (1975).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).
44. See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (observing that
“commerciality has only limited usefulness to a fair use inquiry).
45. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
46. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d at 109; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994).
48. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 3:4 (2014 ed.).
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. In Campbell, the court noted that while a transformative use is not necessary, it furthers
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transformative uses are also held to be fair use.53 The Court adopted this
view in its most recent fair use decision, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, when
it found that the rap group 2 Live Crew’s rendition of “Oh, Pretty
Woman” was transformative due to its parodic nature. 54 Also, the more
transformative a use is, the less significant other factors are, such as its
commercial nature. 55
The second fair use factor directs the court to consider “the nature
of the copyrighted work.” 56 This factor recognizes that some works are
more deserving of copyright protection than others. 57 A common
approach is to differentiate between factual and entertainment works. 58
The scope of fair use is greater for factual or informative works because
they “lend themselves to productive uses by others.” 59 The subsequent
use of informative works also furthers the policy of copyright law by
disseminating information to the public. 60 Therefore, the fair use defense
is narrower for creative or entertainment works because it does not
further the policy of copyright law as much as informative works. 61
However, the distinction between informative and entertainment works
is not dispositive, and it should not be given much weight. 62 In Harper
the goal of copyright law. Id. Since Campbell’s adoption of the transformative test, it has become
the dominant fair use test. See Michael D. Murray, What Is Transformative? An Explanatory
Synthesis of the Convergence of Transformation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use
Law, 11 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 260 (2012).
53. Various empirical studies from 2008 to 2011 indicate that a transformative use almost
always guarantees a finding of fair use. See Murray, supra note 52, at 262.
54. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
55. Id. at 584. This observation that the commercial nature is only one factor to be considered
in the first factor analysis is a retreat from Sony where the Court stated that every commercial use is
presumptively unfair. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
Cases before Sony never recited such a presumption, and Justice Marshall’s papers indicate that the
presumption appeared somewhat spontaneously because it was not included in previous drafts nor
discussed by the justices. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A
Peek Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427, 427
(1993).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012).
57. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
58. PATRY, supra note 48, § 4:1.
59. Sony, 464 U.S. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 595 (1985) (stating that
the law recognizes a greater need for public dissemination of factual works).
61. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (discussing various decisions distinguishing
between creative and factual, or informative, works).
62. While some works may be factual in nature, they can still have more creative expression
than other works classified as fictional works. See PATRY, supra note 48, § 4.1; NIMMER, supra note
26, § 13.05[A][2][a]. Thus, courts tend to avoid a bright line rule and recognize that the amount of
creativity varies by individual works and not categories. See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy?
The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 560, 563 (1982) (noting how there are
gradations among factual works between the amount of “fact or fancy”). As a result, most courts are
reluctant to adopt a categorical approach. See Wade Williams Distribution, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co.,
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& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court also
recognized that whether a work is published or unpublished is a critical
element of its nature. 63 But the unpublished nature of a work is only one
factor to consider, and it should not preclude a finding of fair use. 64
Third, the court must consider “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” 65 This
factor has both a quantitative and qualitative component. 66 The copying
of an entire program militates against a finding of fair use.67 At the same
time, an insubstantial amount of copying may also weigh against a
finding of fair use if it is the “heart” of the work. 68 For instance, in
Harper & Row, the defendant copied and published a portion of
President Ford’s unpublished manuscript. 69 Although the publisher only
used approximately 13% of the work, the portion taken was “the most
interesting and moving part of the entire manuscript.” 70 The Supreme
Court held that this factor did not favor a finding of fair use. 71
Finally, and perhaps the most critical, is the “effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 72 Market
harm is most evident when the defendant duplicates the plaintiff’s work
because the copy acts as a market substitute for the plaintiff’s work. 73
But this analysis also includes consideration of the potential markets that
a copyright holder would generally develop. 74 For instance, in Campbell
vs. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court declined to find market harm for 2
Live Crew’s parody because a copyright holder has no protectable
derivative market for criticism. 75 However, 2 Live Crew’s parody was a

Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5002 (LMM), 2005 WL 774275 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2005) (declining to adopt a rule
that precludes a fair use defense when the works are for entertainment purposes); Hofheinz v.
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 3802 (HB), 2001 WL 1111970, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20,
2001) (refusing to engage in “subjective line-drawing” over what constitutes commentary and
entertainment); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 (recognizing that the amount of expression varies
by works).
63. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
64. After Harper & Row, courts began giving too much weight to the unpublished nature of
works, which induced Congress to amend § 107. See supra note 39.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).
66. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66; PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:1.
67. PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:3.
68. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
73. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 588.
74. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
75. Id. at 592-94.
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rap version of the original work. 76 If the plaintiffs intended on making a
rap version of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” then they could have introduced
evidence to show the market harm to this derivative market. 77 Overall,
the fourth factor is concerned with whether the defendant’s unrestricted
conduct would have an adverse impact on the demand for the plaintiff’s
work. 78
B. Time-shifting, Ad-skipping, and Library-building
In addition to altering the landscape of secondary liability for
copyright infringement, Sony also held that it is fair use for a Betamax
VTR user to record television programming within their home for later
viewing, a practice known as time-shifting. 79 Sony’s VTRs consisted of
three components: a tuner, a recorder, and an adapter. 80 VTR users could
use the tuner to tune into a particular channel or station, and then the
recording component would make copies of the signals onto a Betamax
tape. 81 The adapter converted the signals from the Betamax tape to the
television so a user could watch the recordings. 82 VTRs also had pause
and fast forward functions. 83 While recording, a user could press and
hold the pause button to omit that portion of programming from the
recording. 84 Thus, a user could omit commercials in the recording,
“provided, of course, that the viewer is present when the program is
recorded.” 85 The Court did not rule on the legality of ad-skipping,
though, because it was far too tedious of a practice at the time to make it
a significant threat to the plaintiffs.86 Additionally, users could use the
fast forward button to rapidly skip advertisements or segments of the
recorded programs. 87 The surveys presented at trial also showed that a
vast number of users had accumulated libraries of recordings, but this
practice did not prove to be too detrimental because of the transaction
costs for the consumer. 88
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 572-74.
Id. at 593-94.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); see also
NIMMER, supra note 26, § 13.05 [A][4].
79. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417.
80. Id. at 422.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 423.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 452 n. 36.
87. Id. at 423.
88. One witness initially set out to build a library of tapes but the costs of purchasing
cassettes proved too expensive. Id. at 423 n. 3.
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Universal argued that Sony provided the “means” for infringement
and that precedent held it should be liable for contributory
infringement. 89 Justice Stevens disagreed and borrowed patent law’s
staple article of commerce doctrine, which immunizes a defendant if his
or her component or object is capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. 90 The Court thus faced the ultimate question: was the VTR capable
of substantial non-infringing uses? 91
The Court found that private, non-commercial time-shifting
satisfied its new standard for two reasons. 92 First, some copyright
holders did not object to users making copies of their programs. 93 The
district court heard testimony from various commissioners of
professional sports leagues, educational communications agencies, and
people such as Fred Rogers from Mister Rogers Neighborhood, who
voiced no objections to private copying of their copyrighted programs.94
In addition to the authorized copying, the district court also found that
use of the VTR could enlarge the total viewing audience. 95
Second, the Court found that unauthorized time-shifting constituted
fair use, thereby making it a non-infringing use. 96 Applying the first fair
use factor, the Court adopted the district court’s finding that timeshifting for private purposes at one’s home was non-commercial in
nature. 97 For the second and third fair use factors, the Court simply
stated that “when one considers the nature of a televised . . . work . . .
and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which
he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that
the entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of
militating against a finding of fair use.” 98 On the final inquiry, the
potential market effect, the Court stated that for Universal to carry its
burden, it had to prove either that time-shifting itself is harmful or, if it
became widespread, that it would adversely affect the potential market
for Universal’s copyrighted programming. 99 To show this, Universal did
not need to show actual harm; it merely needed to show “some

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.” 100 With this clarification,
the Court reasoned that Universal failed to carry its burden because its
predictions of market harm hinged on speculation, and it presented no
evidence that it had incurred any actual harm. 101
Justice Blackmun dissented, claiming that the Court’s opinion
severely altered and ignored the doctrines of fair use and contributory
infringement. 102 The fair use doctrine exists to protect productive works
that further the policy of copyright law, and time-shifting did not do
that. 103 According to him, the Court misapplied two of the fair use
factors while completely ignoring the other two. 104 Specifically, it failed
to properly consider the potential market for the copyrighted works by
focusing only on the fact that there has been no harm to the copyright
holder. 105 Instead, the Court should have focused on the impairment of
Universal’s ability to demand compensation for the use of their
copyrighted works. 106 The fact that the Betamax VTR created a potential
market of “time-shifters” in which the copyright holder had not entered
before does not mean Sony can exploit it without compensating the
copyright holders. 107
Much has changed since 1984. Sony’s Betamax VTR is a device of
the past, and the modern time-shifting device is the DVR. 108 A
traditional DVR is comparable to a VTR because it simply records
television programming on a hard drive rather than a cassette. 109 But
even traditional DVRs are far more than just modern VTRs because the
features are augmented, they can split the advertising and content, record
a tremendous amount more than a VTR, and various other reasons. 110 A
primary reason for the enhanced features of the DVR is the switch from
analog to digital transmission. 111 The switch to digital television
100. Id.
101. Id. at 451-55.
102. Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 485.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 484-85.
107. Id. at 485 (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57
(2d Cir. 1980)).
108. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008).
109. Daniel E. Abrams, Comment, Personal Video Recorders, Emerging Technology and the
Threat to Antiquate the Fair Use Doctrine, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 127, 134 (2004).
110. See generally Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising
and Content, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 206 (2004); Abrams, supra note 109, at 134-35; Ned Snow,
The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV.
27, 35 (2005).
111. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began a mandatory transition from
analog to digital transmission in 2006 and completed it in 2012. See Thomas S. Fletcher, Note,
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proliferated the availability and use of DVRs. Specifically, between the
2007-2008 and 2010-2011television seasons, the use of DVRs doubled
from 19% to 38%. 112
Although digital television (DTV) offers more features for
consumers, it also poses a significant risk of piracy for content
owners. 113 Addressing this problem, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) passed a form of Digital Rights Management called
the Broadcast Flag. 114 Content providers would be given the ability to
“flag” the content they provided, and hardware manufacturers of DTVrelated devices were required to include a chip that could detect the
flagged content. 115 The Broadcast Flag limited what consumers could
record with their DTV device. 116 Not surprisingly, the Broadcast Flag
encountered much controversy. 117 The American Library Association
filed suit against the FCC, and the court held that the FCC overstepped
its authority. 118 In response, several representatives introduced the
Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005 to give the FCC the
appropriate authority, but the bill died after its introduction into the
House. 119 The FCC litigation never addressed whether time-shifting of
DTV constituted fair use. 120
Only two other cases have surfaced since Sony, and they did not
disturb its fair use holding. 121 In Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, a
cable service provider released a remote storage digital video recorder
(RS-DVR), which differed from a traditional DVR because it stored
recorded copies on Cablevision’s remote server instead of a hard drive in

American Library Ass’n v. FCC: Charting the Future of Content Protection for Digital Television,
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 613, 615 (2006); In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in
the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, 27 F.C.C. RCD. 8610, 8612 (2012) [hereinafter
Annual Assessment]. For the benefits of digital transmission, see Andrew W. Bagley & Justin S.
Brown, The Broadcast Flag: Compatible with Copyright Law & Incompatible with Digital Media
Consumers, 47 IDEA 607, 608 (2007).
112. Annual Assessment, supra note 111, at 8613.
113. Bagley & Brown, supra note 111, at 608; see also In Re Digital Broad. Content Prot., 18
F.C.C. RCD. 23550, 23552 (2003).
114. Bagley & Brown, supra note 111, at 608.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Fletcher, supra note 111, at 621-27.
118. Am. Library Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 406 F.3d 689, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
119. Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4569, 109th Cong. (2005). See
generally Jessica L. Talar, Comment, My Place or Yours: Copyright, Place-Shifting, & the
Slingbox: A Legislative Proposal, 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 25, 44-46 (2007).
120. Bagley & Brown, supra note 111, at 609.
121. See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.
2008); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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the user’s set-top box. 122 The plaintiffs only alleged direct infringement
against Cablevision, not contributory infringement. 123 Consequently, the
case turned on who made the copies: the user or Cablevision.124 The
Second Circuit held that Cablevision did not meet the volitional conduct
threshold to impose direct liability. 125 The decision did not address
whether time-shifting with the RS-DVR constituted fair use. 126
The second case arose in 2004 when Paramount Pictures sued
RePlay TV for offering a DVR with a function that enabled its users to
skip commercials. 127 Users could also send their recordings to other
RePlay TV subscribers via high-speed internet connections. 128 The
litigation drained the defendant’s bank accounts, causing it to file for
bankruptcy. 129 A third party then purchased the defendant’s company
and chose not to include the two features at issue in the litigation.130 As a
result, the court dismissed the case. 131 Around the same time, Congress
passed the Family Home Movie Act, which created a copyright
infringement exemption for makers of devices that skip obscene or
offensive content in motion pictures. 132 The original version of the
statute excluded ad-skipping technologies from the exception. 133
However, the Senate opposed this provision and feared that it would
create inferences regarding the pending ad-skipping litigation. 134 Thus,
neither the legislature nor the judiciary ever addressed the issue.
In sum, Sony held that time-shifting with a VTR is fair use. 135
Despite technological changes, the legality of time-shifting remains
unchallenged because it is assumed Sony controls. 136 By only addressing
time-shifting, Sony did not expressly decide whether library-building or
ad-skipping is considered fair use. 137 The plaintiffs in RePlayTV relied
122. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 126.
125. Id. at 133.
126. Id.
127. Complaint at 48, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (Civ. No. 01-09358 CAS (Ex)).
128. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
129. Ethan O. Notkin, Note, Television Remixed: The Controversy over Commercial-Skipping,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 899, 917 (2006).
130. Id.
131. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
132. Id. at 917.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 918.
135. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 457 (1984).
136. See Bradley Hamburger, Digital Video Recorders, Advertisement Avoidance, and Fair
Use, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567, 576 (2010).
137. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that
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on this when it brought claims against RePlayTV, but the action did not
provide answers. 138 The legislature had the opportunity to address the
issue, but chose to leave it to the courts. 139 Therefore, the legality of adskipping, library-building, and modern time-shifting has yet to be
adequately addressed by the judiciary or legislature.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Facts of the Case
Fox is one of the four major broadcasting networks in the United
States. 140 It comprises over 200 affiliated local broadcast stations that
broadcast television programming free of charge to the general public.141
Fox recoups the costs of “free television” by selling advertising spots
and by entering into retransmission consent agreements with cable or
satellite providers, collectively called multichannel video programming
distributors (MVPDs). 142 The advertising sales constitute 90% of Fox’s
revenue and enable it to heavily invest in creating, producing, and
distributing its programming. 143 The most valued spot for commercial
advertising is during primetime programming. 144 “Primetime” refers to
the time when television programming has the highest viewership. 145
Thus, advertisers pay higher prices for commercial advertising during
primetime programming because more viewers see it.146
Fox’s retransmission agreements permit MVPDs to retransmit
television programming through their own cable or satellite broadcasting
systems. 147 Some agreements may also permit the MVPDs to provide a
library of Fox’s previously aired programming and make it immediately
accessible to its users. 148 This is commonly called video-on-demand
(VOD) services. 149 Fox also licenses its previously aired programming
to companies in secondary markets, such as Hulu, Amazon, or iTunes,
time-shifting, ad-skipping, and library-building were at issue in Sony, but the Court only held timeshifting was fair use).
138. Notkin, supra note 129, at 917.
139. Id. at 918.
140. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
141. Complaint, supra note 14, at 8.
142. Id. at 21-23.
143. Annual Assessment, supra note 111, at 8695.
144. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 21-23.
145. Id. at 22.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. at 24.
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who then stream the content to their own subscribers. 150
Dish Network is the third largest cable and satellite television
provider in the United States with over 14 million subscribers. 151 After
its purchase of Blockbuster’s assets in 2011, it emerged as a competitor
in VOD services with its new offering of the Blockbuster@Home
service. 152 Dish also released a similar service, the Hopper Whole-Home
HD DVR System (the “Hopper”), in March 2012. 153 The Hopper
functions as a combination of a traditional DVR and a VOD service. 154 It
resembles a traditional DVR because it allocates a portion of its 2TB
hard drive for its users to save programs of their choosing. 155 The
remainder of the hard drive is used to store up to 100 hours of primetime
programming from the Major Networks. 156 Users can “enable”
Primetime Anytime (PTAT) with the click of a button on their remote.157
Once enabled, users can also specifically select which primetime
programming they wish to record. 158 If the user does not predetermine
what programming he wishes to record, Dish will record the primetime
programming from the Major Networks every night by default. 159 A user
may also elect to save the PTAT copies onto the traditional DVR portion
of the Hopper within an eight-day period. 160
PTAT is also accompanied with the “AutoHop” feature. 161 At the
click of a button, a Dish user can eliminate all commercial
advertisements in the PTAT recordings. 162 Dish technicians in Wyoming
manually view the primetime recordings, mark the start and end times of
the commercials, and then transmit an “announcement” file to its
subscribers. 163 In addition to the “announcement’ file, Dish has three
“beta Hoppers” that test the file for quality assurance purposes.164 Unlike
the common 30-second skip feature on most DVRs, the viewer simply
has to enable AutoHop and the recording skips to the next segment of

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. See also Annual Assessment, supra note 111, at 8622.
See Complaint, supra note 14, at 29.
Fox, 723 F.3d at 1071.
Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 1095-96.
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1072.
Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the program. 165 Dish’s Hopper also works with up to three other set-top
boxes in the household, called “Joeys.” 166 The Joeys can access any of
the programs recorded on the Hopper. 167 Moreover, the Hopper works
with the “Sling Adapter,” which provides its users access to their
recorded programs on their computers and mobile devices. 168
B. Procedural History
Shortly after Dish released its AutoHop service in May 2012, Dish
filed for a declaratory judgment in New York’s Southern District against
the Major Networks, stating its services did not infringe or breach its
retransmission agreements. 169 Fox simultaneously filed a complaint in
the Central District of California alleging that Dish’s PTAT and
AutoHop features directly and indirectly infringed its copyrights. 170
Specifically, Fox asserted Dish should be liable for contributory
copyright infringement. 171 The Southern District of New York held that
Dish’s copyright claim was an improper anticipatory filing and
accordingly dismissed it. 172 Meanwhile, in California’s Central District,
Fox moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Dish from the
continued operation and offering of its allegedly infringing products and
services. 173 The district court denied the motion, holding that Fox did not
show a likelihood of success on its contributory infringement claim
because it “failed to circumvent Sony.” 174 In other words, Dish could not
be liable for contributory infringement because its users’ conduct did not
constitute infringement. 175 Fox appealed to the Ninth Circuit on the
ground that the district court failed to appreciate the factual differences
between the time-shifting at issue in Sony and Dish’s PTAT and
AutoHop services. 176
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 (C.D. Cal.
2012).
170. Complaint, supra note 14.
171. Id.
172. Dish Network, L.L.C. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., No. 12 CIV. 4155 (LTS) (KNF), 2012
WL 2719161 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012). In October 2013, the court also dismissed the Major
Networks’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that Dish was likely to succeed on its fair
use claim. Id.
173. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5-7, Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
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C. Decision
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and agreed
that Sony provided strong guidance. 177 Although Sony never ruled on the
legality of ad-skipping and library-building, the Ninth Circuit found this
immaterial because Fox only owns copyrights in the programming and
not the commercials. 178 Thus, the court excluded Dish’s AutoHop
feature from its fair use analysis because ad-skipping does not implicate
Fox’s copyright interests. 179
For the first fair use factor, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the
purpose and character of PTAT is similar to time-shifting in Sony. 180
Next, the court cited Sony’s analysis of the second and third fair use
factors, without discussing any factual differences between the two
cases. 181 Finally, the court noted that the potential market harm analysis
differed from Sony because a secondary market exists in which Fox
licenses its programming. 182 However, the court reasoned that Fox and
its amici only feared the harm from ad-skipping and not the availability
of VOD services. 183 Although the district court acknowledged that
Dish’s AutoHop service harmed Fox’s ability to negotiate a value and
enter into similar licensing agreements for its programming, the
appellate court found this harm inapplicable because it addressed a
different question in the opinion. 184 The court therefore concluded that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to deny Fox’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. 185
III.

ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Fox failed
to establish a likelihood of success on its contributory infringement
claim because the user-made PTAT copies qualified as fair use under
Sony, and therefore there was no infringement for which Dish could be
liable. 186 The court severely misconstrued the doctrine of fair use to
reach this conclusion. 187 First, it erred by excluding AutoHop and
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Fox, 723 F.3d 1067.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1075-76.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1076.
See infra Part IV.B.
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creating an unprecedented rule. Next, the court conducted an inadequate
fair use analysis by ignoring the factual differences between Sony and
Fox v. Dish Network proceedings. This is evident in its analysis of all
four fair use factors. 188 If the court had observed the differences, it
would not have used Sony’s fair use analysis as a crutch in its decision,
and it would have found that all four factors weigh against a finding of
fair use for Dish.
A. Exclusion of AutoHop
The first issue with the Ninth Circuit’s fair use analysis is its
exclusion of Dish’s AutoHop feature. 189 The court held that AutoHop
should be excluded from the market harm analysis because it merely
skips over portions of the PTAT copies that Fox does not have a
copyright interest in. 190 This reasoning is doctrinally unsound and
inconsistent with Sony and the goals of copyright law. 191
Fair use analysis assumes that an unauthorized copy has been made
already and focuses on whether the use of that copy is fair.192 The Ninth
Circuit found that Fox presented a prima facie case of copyright
infringement because Dish users make copies of its programming. 193
When Dish users make the copies, the commercials are still included. 194
The fact that Dish users enable AutoHop to skip the advertisements is
part of the use of the infringing copy. The court avoided this conclusion
and reasoned that using AutoHop is not part of the use because it does
not implicate Fox’s copyright. 195 In other words, the court reasoned that
AutoHop should be excluded from the analysis because it is not
copyright infringement in itself. 196 This is backwards reasoning. A prima
facie case of infringement requires the court to determine what the
defendant took that is protected by the copyright holder, and the court
already made this finding. 197 The effect of the court’s reasoning is an
unprecedented rule that excludes certain uses under a fair use analysis if

188. See infra Part IV.B.
189. See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075.
190. Id.
191. See supra Part II.
192. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 5, Fox, 723 F.3d 1067.
193. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074.
194. Commercials are only excluded from the recording if the user enables “AutoHop.” Id. at
1072.
195. Id. at 1075.
196. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192, at 5.
197. The court stated earlier in its opinion that Fox established a prima facie case of
infringement. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074.
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that use itself is not copyright infringement. 198 This boils down to
requiring a second act of copyright infringement for the plaintiff to
defeat a fair use defense. 199
If Fox has no copyright interest in the commercials, this fact should
be included in the fair use analysis rather than excluded. In Harper &
Row, the Supreme Court did not exclude the unprotected portions of
President Ford’s memoir in Nation’s infringing copy. 200 Instead, it
distinguished between what was protected and unprotected when
discussing the amount and substantiality of the portion used. 201 Thus,
rather than exclude the entire AutoHop function, the Ninth Circuit
should have included it for its third factor analysis.
The Ninth Circuit’s exclusion of AutoHop is also inconsistent with
precedent and the policy of copyright law. The only decision that ever
addressed ad-skipping is Sony. Although the Ninth Circuit quoted nearly
all of Sony’s fair use analysis, it coincidentally left out the part where
Sony addressed this. 202 The Supreme Court did not believe ad-skipping
posed a significant threat to the copyright holders because it was a far
too tedious practice with the VTR. 203 The Court did not state, however,
that ad-skipping does not implicate the plaintiffs’ copyright interests. 204
In addition to the Ninth Circuit’s inconsistency with Sony, its new
rule conflicts with the policy of copyright law. 205 The Ninth Circuit’s
new rule broadens the fair use doctrine and makes it nearly impossible to
enforce a copyright. 206 This renders copyright protection merely
symbolic, rather than effective, which is the concern voiced in Sony. 207
Authors will have no incentive to create if nearly all subsequent uses of
their works fall under the Ninth Circuit’s new “blanket” rule. 208
In sum, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly excluded AutoHop from its
fair use analysis. Skipping commercials with AutoHop is a way in which

198. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192, at 18.
199. Id.
200. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 (1985).
201. Id.
202. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192, at 5 (arguing that Sony
expressly addressed commercial-skipping).
203. Sony Corp. of Am. v. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452 n.36 (1984).
204. Id.
205. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
206. See Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 192 (giving an example of
an “Infringing Book of the Month Club” where, even though an individual illegally downloaded a
book online, the Ninth Circuit’s new rule would treat it as fair use).
207. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
208. A policy of copyright law is to reward authors for their creative efforts. See id. at 477
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). A broad rule that renders nearly all uses of a copyright work to be fair
will deter creators if they have no legal mechanism to adequately enforce their rights in their works.
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the unauthorized copy is used. By requiring the use to implicate Fox’s
copyright interests, the Ninth Circuit established an unprecedented rule
that is inconsistent with Sony and the goals of copyright law.
B. First Fair Use Factor
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis under the first fair use factor is flawed
for two reasons. First, it failed to address whether the PTAT copies are
transformative. The Supreme Court’s most recent precedent explicitly
states that the central purpose under the first fair use factor is to
determine whether the new work is transformative. 209 This is the
dominant test used by courts, and interestingly enough it parallels the
“productive” inquiry espoused by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in
Sony. 210 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ignored Supreme Court precedent that
has reasoning contrary to the rationale in Sony. The second issue is the
Ninth Circuit equating Dish’s PTAT service to Sony’s VTR, reasoning
that it is likewise used for time-shifting and non-commercial purposes.
1. The PTAT Copies are Not Transformative
The PTAT copies are not transformative. A work is transformative
if it adds new expression, meaning, or character to the work. 211
Referencing the PTAT copies, the court expressly recognized that “the
program content is not altered in any way.” 212 The only difference
between Fox’s original broadcast programming and the PTAT copy is
the medium in which it is embodied, and courts consistently hold that
this is not transformative.213 Moreover, the district court held that Dish’s
quality assurance copies are non-transformative. 214 Since there is no
difference between the quality assurance copies and the PTAT copies for
Dish’s users, it follows that the court would likely find them to also be
non-transformative. 215
209. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994).
210. See PATRY, supra note 48, § 3:9; Murray, supra note 52.
211. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.212. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d
1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).
212. Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).
213. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that
courts are “reluctant to find fair use when an original work is merely retransmitted in a different
medium”); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (reasoning that the
defendant’s retransmission of a radio broadcast leaves the original broadcasts unchanged); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
converting CDs into MP3 files is insufficient to be transformative).
214. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
215. After Dish’s technicians mark the files, they send an announcement to Dish’s users with a
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A defendant’s use can also be transformative when it serves a
different function than the original work. 216 However, the PTAT copies
are used for the same entertainment purposes as the original
broadcast. 217 This conclusion could be avoided if Dish’s users also used
the programming for commentary or criticism purposes, but as the court
recognized, the program content is not altered in any way. 218 It can be
argued that once AutoHop is enabled, Dish users alter the work by
eliminating the commercials. Yet in reality this is merely trimming the
insignificant parts while maintaining the most essential parts of the
programming, which is non-transformative. 219
To summarize, it is probably not an accident that the Ninth Circuit
neglected to address whether the PTAT copies are transformative. It is
unlikely Dish could convince the court that the PTAT copies satisfy this
standard. Dish users do not alter the content of Fox’s programming in
any manner, and the copies surely do not further the ultimate goal of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. If the court considered
whether the PTAT copies were transformative, it would undoubtedly
weigh against a finding of fair use.
2. PTAT is Not Used for Time-shifting
The district court found that Dish users’ PTAT copies were used for
time-shifting purposes. 220 The Ninth Circuit adopted this finding and
reasoned that since Sony held such a use is noncommercial, Dish’s
PTAT service must likewise be noncommercial. 221 A closer look at the
facts of Sony and Fox v. Dish Network shows that PTAT is not as
comparable to Sony’s VTR as the court purported it to be. Moreover, the
purpose of the PTAT is more akin to library-building rather than timeshifting, and it is more commercial in nature than the VTR.
The modern version of time-shifting is arguably done with a
traditional DVR. This is because users can select the programming they
wish to watch at a later time and simply record it on a hard drive rather

copy of the file. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1072.
216. Murray, supra note 52, at 276.
217. Cf. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1078 (PTAT “is ‘similar,’ even though not exactly the same, as timedelayed or video-on-demand programming”).
218. See Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (ruling that the band
Green Day’s use of the plaintiff’s copyrighted image in its music video was transformative for its
commentary purposes on Christianity).
219. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
220. Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (C.D. Cal.
2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
221. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075.
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than Betamax. 222 There are obvious differences between a DVR and
Sony’s VTR, but these differences have not been litigated because it is
assumed that use of the traditional DVR is still protected under Sony. 223
Although Dish’s Hopper HD DVR system has a traditional DVR
segment, Fox chose not to object to its use 224 If it did make such an
argument, Sony would most likely control. Instead, Fox takes issue with
PTAT and AutoHop because they equate to library-building and adskipping, rather than time-shifting. 225
To demonstrate how PTAT mirrors library-building, it is necessary
to show how the reason for making PTAT copies is not equivalent to the
time-shifting purpose in Sony. In Sony, the Court defined time-shifting
as “the practice of recording a program to view it once at a later time,
and thereafter erasing it.” 226 The Court further stated that time-shifting is
when an individual records a program he cannot view as it is being
televised so he can watch it at a later date. 227 This definition does not
correspond with the use of PTAT for various reasons. First, Dish users
do not need the foresight to select which program they want to watch at
a later time; VTR users had to set the tuner to the channel they wished to
record. 228 Also, Dish users do not need to select which programming
they wish to record. 229 Instead, they simply enable PTAT, and all
primetime programming from the four Major Networks is recorded in
perpetuity. 230 The advertising and name of PTAT itself show that PTAT
is not merely a system used to shift programming that the user intends to
watch at a later date. 231 Instead, it is used to create an instantaneous
library of programming to be accessed at “anytime.” 232

222. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008). But
see Picker, supra note 110, at 206 (claiming that the DVR “is much more than just a souped-up
VCR”).
223. See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074.
224. Complaint, supra note 14, at 3.
225. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075.
226. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984) (emphasis
added).
227. Id. at 421.
228. Id. at 422-23.
229. By default, PTAT records programming on all four major networks every day of the
week. Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2012),
aff’d 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
230. Id.
231. When Dish first released PTAT, it expressly stated that PTAT creates an on-demand
library of up to 100 hours of programming. See Press Release, DISH Network, L.L.C., Hopper
Whole-Home HD DVR System Now Available From DISH (Mar. 15, 2012), available at DISH,
http://about.dish.com/press-release/products-and-services/hopper-whole-home-hd-dvr-system-nowavailable-dish.
232. If a Dish subscriber connects the Hopper with a Sling Adapter, he or she can watch his or

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

23

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 8 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5

196

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[8:173

Another distinction is that Dish users can record up to four
programs at once because of the multiple tuners and satellite
transponder. 233 A VTR user could record only one program at a time. 234
This technological limitation is consistent with the definition of timeshifting because it recorded the program the VTR user was unable to
view at the time of broadcast. The Hopper is equipped with multiple
tuners and a satellite transponder that enables users to simultaneously
record the primetime programming from the four Major Networks. 235
The result is that Dish users are not time-shifting a program they would
have watched. Instead, they are time-shifting programs. It is also
impractical to equate the VTR with Dish’s PTAT because when VTR
users set their tuners, they were also able to watch the original
broadcast. 236 Dish users are not practically able to watch programming
on the Major Networks simultaneously. 237 Moreover, after watching the
PTAT copies, a Dish user can elect to save them on the traditional DVR
segment of the Hopper. 238 Thus, users do not record the program and
thereafter erase it.
A final distinction is the level of involvement that Dish has with the
PTAT process. The PTAT process involves more than an individual
time-shifting a program to watch at a later time. 239 Dish provides the
programming, sends its subscribers the links for the PTAT copies, and
has an ongoing relationship with its customers. 240 Dish also has the
capability to determine the availability of programming. 241 In Sony, the
defendants did not maintain contact with the VTR users and had no
control over what the users did with its product. 242 The plaintiffs in Sony
never alleged that Sony had involvement in the copying process. 243 The
her primetime programming on a computer, tablet, or phone, even away from home. Id.; see also
Hopper DVR, DISH, http://www.dish.com/technology/hopper/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
233. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
234. Betamax users could only watch one live broadcast while recording another for later
viewing. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 422 (1984).
235. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
236. Sony, 464 U.S. at 422.
237. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
238. PTAT copies are automatically deleted after eight days. Id. Dish users can avoid this by
making copies to save in their “My Recordings” folder. Id.
239. Sony, 464 U.S.at 421.
240. In fact, the district court observed how Dish had a closer relationship with its subscribers
than the defendants in Cablevision. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1101.
241. Dish can change the start and end times of primetime programming to fall outside the
regular primetime timeframe. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067,
1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
242. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
243. On appeal, the Court only considered whether Sony could be held liable for the alleged
copyright infringement done by Betamax users. Id. at 420.
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fact that Dish’s involvement in the copying process is being litigated
highlights the difference between the two defendants. Even if the
volitional conduct argument is ignored, the fact that Dish provides the
programming to the user and has the technological capability to maintain
contact with its users undeniably shows that it has more involvement
with the copying process than the defendant in Sony. 244 In short, this
level of involvement is significant because it is more than an individual
recording a program to be viewed at a later time.
If the purpose of PTAT is not comparable to the traditional DVR
and is not equivalent to the time-shifting discussed in Sony, this begs the
question – what is it comparable to? Library-building. Justice Blackmun
defined library-building as the practice of recording a program and
keeping it for repeated viewing over a longer period of time. 245 Thus, it
differs from time-shifting because it is not immediately erased. Once
PTAT is enabled, the copies are saved for eight days. 246 The eight-day
limitation is misleading, though, because users can save the individual
copies to the traditional DVR segment of the Hopper. 247 The obvious
counterpoint is that, just because Dish users have that capability, it does
not necessarily mean they are utilizing it. For instance, VTR users did
not library-build because of the associated costs. 248 However, the threat
of library-building is much more imminent with PTAT because the costs
and ease of library-building are substantially different. 249 Thus, it is
more likely that Dish users engage in library-building.
Most importantly, the underlying purpose of PTAT is similar to
library-building. The purpose of collecting a library of recordings is for
the convenience of having a wide selection of programs to choose from.
Once PTAT is enabled, it records the Major Networks’ primetime
programming on a daily basis, ultimately amassing a library of up to 100

244. The volitional conduct doctrine is used to determine whether a party exercises a sufficient
degree of conduct to hold him directly liable instead of indirectly liable. See Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (reasoning that Cablevision merely
made the copying option available to its users, therefore not possessing a sufficient degree of
volitional conduct to be directly liable). See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On–Line Commc’n
Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (claiming that there should be some element of
volitional conduct to hold a party directly liable); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
556 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant’s short screening process was only cursory and
insufficient to hold it directly liable).
245. Sony, 464 U.S. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246. See Hopper DVR, supra note 232.
247. Id.
248. One witness testified that he bought Sony’s VTR with the intention of building a library,
but it proved to be too expensive. Sony, 464 U.S. at 423 n.3.
249. For instance, a Dish subscriber simply has to select “enable” at no additional cost, and
PTAT records up to 100 hours of programming. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2.
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hours of programming. 250 This is because users record four channels at
once. 251 The result is that Dish users have over 100 hours of primetime
programming to choose from. 252 Put another way, they are not watching
a program they recorded for later viewing, but choosing from a plethora
of recordings.
In sum, there are various differences between Sony the Ninth
Circuit’s characterization of a Dish subscriber’s use of PTAT for timeshifting purposes. This distinction is significant because Sony deemed
time-shifting a fair use and not library-building. Thus, treating the use of
PTAT as library-building should make Sony less influential in the fair
use analysis.
3. PTAT Copies are More Commercial than Time-shifting in Sony
There are factual differences that render the purpose of copying
Fox’s primetime programming more commercial in nature than the timeshifting present in Sony. Dish users do not sell the PTAT copies to the
public and neither did Sony’s VTR users. 253 Because of this similarity,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the use is equally as noncommercial.254
This is a misconception of the profit/nonprofit distinction. In Harper &
Row, the Supreme Court clarified this inquiry and stated that the Court
should not focus on whether the defendant’s sole motive is monetary
gain, but rather whether the defendant stands to gain from exploiting the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price for it. 255
Subsequent cases also hold that an infringer does not need to directly
benefit. 256 Rather, commercial use can be shown when an individual
makes copies to avoid the expense of purchasing lawful copies. 257
This clarification further shows how the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is
flawed. At the time of Sony, no secondary market existed for the
copyright holder’s works, and therefore VTR users did not avoid paying
the customary price for their recordings. 258 The Ninth Circuit even
acknowledged this fact later in its opinion.259 The present litigation

250. Id.
251. By default, PTAT records the programming from all four networks every night. Fox
Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
252. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 2.
253. See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075; Sony, 464 U.S. at 425.
254. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075.
255. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
256. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
257. Id.
258. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1076.
259. Id.
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differs from Sony because a secondary market does exist.260 Dish’s users
avoid paying this customary price by recording Fox’s primetime
programming through PTAT. Thus, Dish users gain by not paying the
customary price for Fox’s programming.
Another distinction to be drawn between the two cases is the
exploitative nature of the use. Even if a use is commercial, it is given
less weight when it is incidental rather than exploitative. 261 For instance,
a search engine that reproduces copyrighted images is only incidentally
commercial when it is not using the images to promote its website or
profiting from them. 262 An example of exploitative use is the repeated
and widespread sharing of music files. 263 The use of PTAT more closely
resembles the widespread sharing of music files. 264 Once PTAT is
enabled, Dish users record Fox’s programming on a daily basis for as
long as they desire. 265 As previously stated, the time-shifting in Sony
involved a user that recorded a single program who then viewed it
once. 266 Given this difference, Dish’s PTAT appears to be more
exploitative than the use of Sony’s VTR.
The discussion above illustrates the many errors in the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis of the first fair use factor. The Supreme Court’s most
recent fair use decision directs the court to consider the transformative
nature of the defendant’s use. 267 It is not coincidental that the Ninth
Circuit ignored this factor because Dish users do not alter the
programming in any manner. There are significant factual differences
between Sony’s VTR and Dish’s PTAT that render the use of PTAT
more akin to library-building rather than time-shifting, but the court
failed to acknowledge this.
The more transformative a work is, the less significant other factors
are, such as commercialism. 268 The inverse is also true: the less
transformative a work is, the more important other factors become, such
as commercialism. 269 Although Dish users do not sell the PTAT copies,
the use appears to be more commercial in nature than the use of Sony’s

260. Fox licenses its primetime programming with and without commercials to companies
such as Hulu, who then offer it to their subscribers for a fee. Id. at 1070.
261. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).
262. Id.
263. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001).
264. See id.
265. Once PTAT is enabled, Dish records the primetime programming from the Major
Networks every weekday. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1071.
266. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984).
267. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
268. Id.
269. See id.
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VTR. The court’s errors collectively show that the first fair use factor
should have weighed against a finding of fair use.
C. Second and Third Fair Use Factor
The Ninth Circuit purported to apply the second and third use
factors by quoting verbatim the Sony Court’s one-sentence analysis of
those factors. 270 This is the most troubling of the court’s opinion because
Sony “all but ignores” these factors. 271 The bare analysis for both factors
in Sony can be found within one sentence of the decision, where Justice
Stevens stated:
[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised . . . work . . . and that
timeshifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the
entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of mili272
tating against a finding of fair use.

Considering the more recent Supreme Court decisions and factual
differences between Sony and Fox v. Dish Network, these factors should
also weigh against a fair use finding.
1. Second Fair Use Factor
The second factor directs the court to consider the “nature of the
copyrighted work.” 273 This includes recognizing whether the works are
close to the core of copyright protection. 274 There is a greater need to
disseminate factual works compared to fictional works. 275 As a result, a
court is more likely to find the use of factually based works to be fair. 276
To the contrary, a court is less likely to consider the use of a creative
work to be fair because there is a greater need to protect them. 277 The
Court in Sony explicitly recognized that copyrighted material with broad
potential secondary markets, such as motion pictures, deserve more
protection than news broadcasts. 278 Fox’s programming is comparable to
motion pictures and fictional short stories. Shows such as Family Guy
and Bones are purely fictional and do not convey newsworthy
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Fox, 723 F.3d at 1075.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 496 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
Id. at 449 (majority opinion).
17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563, 588 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984).
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information for which there is a public need.
The fact that Fox’s primetime programming is close to the core of
copyright protection differs from Sony. First, Sony addressed whether it
was infringement for a VTR user to record television programming in
general. 279 The testimony at trial included representatives from
professional sports leagues, educational institutions, and religious
organizations. 280 The Court also acknowledged that some televised
works did not have copyright protection. 281 The plaintiffs’ own
copyrights comprised of about 9-10% of the entire spectrum of
television programming in question. 282 Fox’s primetime programming is
the only television programming at issue in the current litigation, and
therefore, its works consist of 100% of the programming in question
rather than 9-10%. 283 Since Fox’s primetime programming is close to the
core of copyright protection and does not include educational
programming, noncopyrighted works, or religious programming, this
factor should weigh more in favor of Fox than it did for the plaintiffs in
Sony.
The Ninth Circuit also failed to consider the “primetime” nature of
Fox’s programming. As Harper & Row recognized, a copyright holder
has an interest in the creative control of its copyrighted work. 284 This
interest includes the choices of when, where, and in what form the work
is offered. 285 Fox offers its copyrighted works, such as Glee, Bones, and
Family Guy, during the primetime hours because it captures the largest
viewing audience. 286 By making the PTAT copies, users undercut Fox’s
legitimate interest in controlling when, where, and how the primetime
programming is viewed. 287 If the copyright holder of an unpublished
memoir has an interest in controlling when it is published, then the
copyright holder of television programming should likewise have an
interest in controlling when it is viewed. 288
2. Third Fair Use Factor
The third factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used
279. Id. at 421.
280. Id. at 424.
281. Id. at 433.
282. Id. at 443.
283. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1070-71.
284. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
285. Id.
286. See Complaint, supra note 14, at 1.
287. Dish’s advertisements claim that users can watch programming “on the go” and on smart
phones, computers, tablets, and televisions. See Hopper DVR, supra note 232.
288. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
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in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” weighs against a finding
of fair use. 289 This factor includes a qualitative and quantitative
consideration, and both favor Fox’s cause. 290 For the quantitative part,
courts generally disfavor a finding of fair use when a user copies a work
in its entirety. 291 It is undisputed that Dish users copy Fox’s entire
primetime programming. 292 This is true whether or not AutoHop is
included in the analysis, because as the court stated, Fox does not own
the copyright to the commercials. 293 Thus, at first glance this factor
should weigh in favor of Fox. The flaw to this argument is that the
extent of permissible copying also varies with the purpose of the use in
question. 294 For example, if a plaintiff owns the copyright to a
photograph and the defendant copies it for news-reporting purposes, the
fact that he copied the photograph in its entirety does not have the
ordinary effect of weighing against fair use because the picture would
not have been identifiable if he only copied a portion of it.295 This is the
same reasoning used in Sony when the Court held that copying a
program in its entirety does not have the ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use because the purpose of time-shifting itself is
to watch the entire program. 296
According to this reasoning, it would seem that Sony controls and
that the court should excuse the wholesale copying of Fox’s
programming. However, courts excuse wholesale copying when the
purpose or character of the use is transformative. 297 The Supreme Court
recognized this in Campbell when it excused the amount taken by 2 Live
Crew because of the transformative nature of parody. 298 Thus, the
Supreme Court’s more recent jurisprudence holds that the amount taken
will generally not weigh against a finding of fair use if that use is
transformative. 299 Because Sony predated Campbell, its reasoning is not
applicable because the Court had yet to adopt the transformative test. 300
Accordingly, the fact that users copy all of Fox’s programming should
not have its ordinary effect of militating against a fair use finding if the

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012).
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66; PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:1.
PATRY, supra note 48, § 5:3.
Fox, 723 F.3d at 1074.
Id.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994).
See Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
Id.
See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
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copying is transformative, and as discussed above, there is barely an
argument that the PTAT copies are transformative. 301
The qualitative aspect also weighs against a finding of fair use.
Since Dish users copy the entire programming, it cannot be seriously
argued that they do not take the “heart” of the work. 302 This argument is
even stronger if AutoHop is considered in the analysis because the
“heart” of the work is the programming without the commercials. 303
Once AutoHop is enabled, Dish users are left with a copy that only
consists of the programming and not the commercials they wish to
avoid. 304 With AutoHop enabled, the PTAT copy becomes a condensed
version of the most valuable parts of the programming, and the Supreme
Court has recognized this as weighing against fair use since 1841. 305
As shown, the Ninth Circuit wrote off the second and third fair use
factors by simply quoting Sony. 306 This is improper because the nature of
the works in question is more creative than the works in Sony. This is
because only Fox’s primetime programming is at issue rather than the
entire spectrum of television programming. The third factor should also
weigh against a finding of fair use because the entire work is copied and
the use is not transformative. Overall, both factors should weigh against
a finding of fair use.
D. Fourth Fair Use Factor
The fourth factor requires the court to determine “the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 307
When a subsequent user copies the work in its entirety, it acts as a
market substitute of the original. 308 On the other hand, a transformative
use does not necessarily act as a market substitute and instead reaches
the derivative markets. 309 As discussed, the PTAT copies are neither
transformative nor altered in any manner. 310 Therefore, analysis of the
derivative markets is not necessary, and the analysis should focus on
301. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
302. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985)
(reasoning that Nation took the heart of President Ford’s memoirs).
303. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 723 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).
304. Id.
305. See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
306. See Fox, 723 F.3d at 1070.
307. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
308. In Campbell, the Court stated that Sony’s discussion of a market harm presumption
makes sense in the context of verbatim copying because it acts as a market replacement. Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
309. Id.
310. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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whether the PTAT copies harm the market for Fox’s primetime
programming instead of derivative markets.
The court’s error in this section of the opinion is not because of its
reliance on Sony and its failure to address factual differences. Instead,
the error of the court’s analysis lies in its misapplication of the facts. The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the copies do not harm the market because
Fox does not charge additional fees for MVPDs to offer VOD services,
so long as providers disable fast-forwarding features. 311 Therefore, the
court inferred that only ad-skipping caused the market harm. 312 This is
contrary to the district court’s finding that Dish’s quality assurance
copies cause market harm. 313 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this finding
however, because it addressed a different question in the opinion. 314
The unrestricted and widespread copying of Fox’s primetime
programming surely impairs the market for Fox’s programming. The
court disagreed because it only focused on the ad-skipping aspect. 315 The
record amply demonstrates that Fox licenses its primetime programming
to providers in the secondary market, both with and without
commercials. 316 The licensees enter into the agreements because they
receive the value of the primetime programming and are able to generate
revenue by offering it to its own users. 317 The demand for primetime
programming in the secondary market will diminish if those users can
get the programming without paying any additional cost. 318 With
declining demand, what incentive would secondary market licensees
have to enter into agreements with Fox? Moreover, if the approximately
13.5 million Dish users 319 can save whole seasons of primetime
television on their DVR, the value of the season box sets sold at retail
stores is severely diminished.

311. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1076.
312. Id.
313. Fox Broad. Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1105 (C.D. Cal.
2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
314. Id.
315. The court concluded that only ad-skipping caused market harm and not the time-shifting
or library-building. Fox, 723 F.3d at 1076.
316. Hulu Plus subscribers can watch Fox’s programming in a reduced-commercial format,
while iTunes and Amazon users can purchase the programming commercial-free. Fox, 905 F. Supp.
2d at 1105.
317. For instance, Hulu subscribers need to pay a subscription fee in order to watch the
programming. Id.
318. In fact, Dish’s Vice President stated that its subscribers will not need Hulu after it
releases PTAT. Complaint, supra note 14, at 32.
319. Our Mission, DISH, http://about.dish.com/company-info (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).
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CONCLUSION

The Fox v. Dish Network litigation touches the homes of the
majority of American consumers. But when put in perspective, this
decision is only a fragment of the crumbling broadcasting industry’s
problems as American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. comes before
the Supreme Court and blackouts over retransmission consent agreement
disputes become commonplace. 320 Nevertheless, the Fox v. Dish
Network litigation has the potential to address the legality of modern
time-shifting, ad-skipping, library-building, and even the ambiguous
contributory infringement doctrine.
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit’s decision does not necessarily
answer those questions. If anything, the court obfuscated matters by
excluding AutoHop from its fair use analysis. Moreover, the court’s fair
use analysis is ignorant of the Supreme Court’s most recent precedent
and fact specific nature of the fair use doctrine. 321 Had the Ninth Circuit
conducted a more in-depth analysis, it would have found that Dish did
not present a viable fair use defense to Fox’s contributory infringement
claim.
Critics of this conclusion claim that this would subject innocent
consumers to liability for copyright infringement. This is not accurate.
The purpose of the analysis in Fox v. Dish Network is to determine
whether Fox has a viable claim of contributory copyright infringement
against Dish Network for offering its PTAT and AutoHop service. If the
court had found that use of the PTAT copies is not fair use, then Dish
could be held liable for contributory infringement. Such a decision
would prevent MVPDs like Dish from offering instruments of
widespread infringement in the first place. Even if these services are still
offered, fair use is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The fair use analysis above involved a generalization of all Dish
users. An individual Dish user would only be subject to liability if
warranted under the particular facts.
In the end, fair use is a policy decision left to the courts. There are
no bright line rules and, accordingly, no clear-cut answers. But this does
not divest the courts of their obligation to conduct a fact-specific
analysis to reach a conclusion. The discussion above illustrates that the
Ninth Circuit failed to do this. Many argue that the consequences of Fox
v. Dish Network are inevitable and that the broadcasting industry must
adapt its business model accordingly. But if the business model of the
broadcasting industry is to change, it should be by the invisible hand of
320.
321.
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capitalism, and not by a cursory fair use analysis.
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